Eight charts that reveal how economic rewards have shifted from workers to capital owners, machines, and foreign competitors
Last updated: July 11, 2025 @ 21:42 UTC - Now includes China Shock analysis and tax policy analysis
The following analysis examines peer-reviewed economic literature on the structural forces behind labor's declining share of national income.
In the 1970s, U.S. labor compensation made up roughly 50% of gross value added. By 2022, it had fallen to 44% – though this headline figure overstates the decline. When properly allocating self-employment income between labor and capital (following Elsby et al. 2013), the decline is closer to 4-5 percentage points rather than 8. Even this more modest decline represents a significant shift in economic rewards, driven by technology, globalization, and institutional changes.
Labor's share of income has declined modestly but persistently, with cyclical variations around the trend
Economists have long noted this decline in labor's share, but only recently understood its full implications. After remaining roughly stable for decades – one of Kaldor's "stylized facts" – labor's share began its downward trend in the 1980s. Leading economists like Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez have documented how this shift coincides with surging inequality and wealth concentration.
While the raw numbers show a decline from 50% to 44%, measurement matters. The headline series treats all proprietor income as capital, but self-employed workers earn labor income too. Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2013) show that properly allocating proprietor income reduces the decline by about one-third.
Additionally, labor share is cyclical – it typically falls late in expansions and rises in recessions. The 2023-24 rebound to ~44% suggests some of the recent decline was temporary. Still, even a 4-5 point structural decline represents tens of billions annually shifting from paychecks to profits.
Worker productivity has soared while compensation has barely budged, creating a massive gap
For most of American history, productivity and pay rose in tandem – a social contract ensuring that as workers became more productive, they shared in the gains. But starting in the 1970s, this link was severed. While the raw data shows 388% productivity growth versus 212% compensation growth, using consistent deflators (both CPI or both IPD) reduces this gap by about 40%. Still, even the adjusted gap represents a significant divergence from historical norms.
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) attribute much of this to the declining price of capital goods – as computers and machinery became cheaper, firms substituted technology for workers. Bergholt, Furlanetto, and Maffei-Faccioli (2022) in the American Economic Journal concluded that automation is the single biggest driver of this divergence.
The gap between these lines, while partly reflecting different price deflators, still represents a real shift in economic rewards. Using consistent deflators shows compensation lagging productivity by 50-70 percentage points rather than 176 points – substantial but less dramatic than the headline numbers suggest.
After-tax corporate profits as a percentage of GDP have reached levels not seen since the 1960s
The surge in after-tax corporate profits from ~6% of GDP in the early 1990s to nearly 11% today represents what economists call "financialization" – the increasing dominance of financial motives in the economy. The International Labour Organization (2013) found that financialization was the single largest factor in falling wage shares worldwide, accounting for 46% of the decline.
William Lazonick's research revealed the mechanism: from 2003-2012, S&P 500 companies used 91% of their earnings on stock buybacks and dividends, leaving little for wage increases or productive investment. This "downsize-and-distribute" model replaced the post-war "retain-and-reinvest" approach.
Notice how profit spikes often coincide with recessions – when workers lose bargaining power, corporate profits tend to surge.
Private sector union membership has plummeted, tracking closely with labor's declining share
The decline of unions and labor share show correlation, though the relationship is complex. Western and Rosenfeld (2011) found that union decline explains 20-33% of rising wage inequality among men. However, it's worth noting that some countries experienced union decline without similar labor share drops, suggesting U.S.-specific factors like weaker labor laws and employer opposition played crucial roles.
The visual correlation is striking: as union membership fell from 20% to 10% since 1983, labor's share of GDP fell in near-perfect tandem. Unions didn't just raise wages for members – they set standards that lifted all workers. Their collapse left individual workers powerless against increasingly concentrated corporate power.
A recent Federal Reserve study found that workers' bargaining power declined 10-15% since 1980, directly contributing to wage stagnation.
While federal statutory rates fell from 52% to 21%, effective federal rates (what corporations actually pay) dropped even more dramatically
While the statutory federal rate cut from 52% to 21% was dramatic, the effective rate story is even more striking. In the 1950s, corporations actually paid about 40% of their profits in federal taxes. By 2024, despite a 21% statutory rate, corporations pay just 11.9% in federal taxes – benefiting from loopholes, deductions, and creative accounting. Including state and local taxes adds roughly 3-5 percentage points to these figures.
The decline is staggering: effective corporate tax rates fell from 39.6% in the 1950s to just 8.9% in the 2020s. This means corporations today keep over 90% of their profits, compared to just 60% in the post-war era. Kaymak and Schott (2023) found that this tax decline can explain about half of the labor share decline in manufacturing.
Most shocking: even during the 2017 tax cut, the effective rate was already at historic lows (11.7% in 2010). The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act pushed an already minimal tax burden even lower. In 2020, corporations paid just 8.9% – the lowest effective rate in modern history.
This represents hundreds of billions annually that once funded schools, infrastructure, and social programs now flowing directly to shareholders. It wasn't inevitable – it was a choice.
As corporate tax rates fell from 50% to 21%, labor's share of income declined in near-perfect correlation
The parallel decline of corporate tax rates and labor's share of income is no coincidence. As tax rates fell from around 50% in the 1950s to just 21% today, labor's share dropped from 65% to 57%. This represents one of the clearest policy-outcome relationships in modern economics.
Each major tax cut coincided with a further erosion of worker power: Reagan's 1986 cuts, Bush's 2001 cuts, and Trump's 2017 cuts all accelerated the transfer of income from workers to capital. The mechanism is straightforward: lower taxes increase after-tax returns to capital, incentivizing automation and offshoring while reducing the tax revenue needed for public investments that support workers.
This isn't just correlation – it's causation. When we stopped taxing capital, we stopped valuing labor.
The middle class shrank from 61% to 51% as Americans moved to both extremes – but mostly upward
America's economy has split into two tracks. On one side: capital-intensive firms like Google, Goldman Sachs, and biotech companies that hire fewer, highly-paid workers. On the other: labor-intensive service businesses – restaurants, retail, care work – offering low wages and few benefits.
The casualties? Middle-income jobs that once sustained the American Dream. When Sears employed 300,000 workers in the 1980s, most earned middle-class wages with benefits. Today's retail giant Amazon employs 1.5 million, but most are warehouse workers earning half what Sears employees made (adjusted for inflation). Travel agents, bank tellers, manufacturing workers – entire occupations that provided pathways to the middle class have vanished.
As MIT economist David Autor documented, automation eliminates "routine" middle-skill jobs while complementing high-skill work and leaving low-skill service jobs untouched. The result: job polarization that mirrors income polarization.
The numbers don't lie: while 8% moved up to high incomes, only 3% fell to low incomes. But this masks the real tragedy – those who lost middle-class jobs rarely moved up. Instead, new college graduates claimed the high-income spots while displaced workers competed for service jobs. Same economy, different worlds.
Upper-income households captured nearly all income gains, now holding 48% of total income despite being only 19% of adults
While the middle class shrank by 10 percentage points in population, their share of total income collapsed by 19 points – from 62% to 43%. Meanwhile, the upper-income tier nearly doubled their share from 29% to 48%, despite growing from just 11% to 19% of the population.
This reveals the true nature of inequality: it's not just about how many people are in each tier, but how much of the economic pie they control. Today, the richest 19% of Americans control nearly half of all income – more than the entire middle class.
Most striking: lower-income Americans, despite growing from 27% to 30% of the population, saw their already meager share of income shrink further from 10% to just 9%. The American economy hasn't just polarized – it has fundamentally redistributed rewards upward.
90% of top metro wealth concentrates in just 20 coastal cities while the interior hollows out
America's wealth hasn't just concentrated – it has physically migrated. In 1980, upper-income households were distributed across manufacturing centers like Detroit, Cleveland, and St. Louis. Today, they cluster in a handful of superstar cities: San Francisco, New York, Boston, Seattle, DC.
The numbers are staggering: just 20 metro areas now hold 52% of all upper-income households despite having only 36% of the population. The top 5 metros alone – NY, LA, SF, DC, Boston – contain 25% of all high earners. Meanwhile, the bottom 100 metros combined have seen their share of upper-income households fall from 15% to just 8%.
This isn't natural economic evolution – it's economic abandonment. When a factory closes in Ohio, its engineers move to Silicon Valley. When a bank consolidates in Charlotte, its executives relocate to Manhattan. The middle of America hasn't just lost jobs; it has hemorrhaged its highest earners.
Most devastating: this creates a feedback loop. As high earners leave, tax revenues collapse, schools deteriorate, and infrastructure crumbles – ensuring the next generation of talent will also flee. The American interior is becoming an economic colony of its coasts.
Each robot per 1,000 workers reduces employment by 0.2% and wages by 0.42% (Acemoglu-Restrepo)
The quadrupling of robot density from 1993 to 2015 represents a new phase in the labor-capital struggle. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) found that each additional robot per 1,000 workers reduces employment by 0.2 percentage points and wages by 0.42%. However, these estimates remain debated – some studies find smaller effects, and robots may create offsetting jobs in other sectors.
These are what Acemoglu calls "so-so technologies" – just good enough to replace workers but not transformative enough to create new opportunities. While concerning, history shows that technological disruption often eventually creates new types of work, though the transition can be painful for displaced workers.
The impact compounds: regions with more robots saw larger declines in employment and wages, creating "robot zones" of economic distress. And this is just the beginning – artificial intelligence threatens to automate cognitive work next.
The 0.61% cumulative wage decline represents one estimate of automation's impact. While significant for affected workers, the overall effect on labor share remains under study, with automation explaining perhaps 10-20% of the total decline according to various estimates.
Chinese import penetration surged 12-fold, destroying millions of manufacturing jobs in America's heartland
The "China shock" identified by economists Autor, Dorn, and Hanson represents the most sudden and devastating trade impact ever experienced by American workers. Chinese imports as a share of U.S. spending exploded from 0.6% in 1990 to 7.2% by 2020 – a twelve-fold increase that was particularly dramatic after China's WTO entry in 2001.
The human cost was staggering: 2.4 million manufacturing jobs lost between 1990 and 2007, accounting for 25% of all U.S. manufacturing job losses in that period. Unlike previous trade shocks, these jobs never came back. Workers in affected regions experienced permanent income losses, with wages falling 0.5-0.8 percentage points (central estimate: 0.6pp) in manufacturing employment share for every $1,000 increase in import exposure per worker.
The scatter plot below shows the devastating correlation: regions with higher Chinese import exposure (horizontal axis) experienced dramatically larger manufacturing job losses (vertical axis). Each dot represents an American community whose economic foundation was swept away by the tide of globalization.
Each $1,000 increase in Chinese import exposure per worker led to a 0.5-0.8 percentage point decline in manufacturing employment share of working-age population (central estimate: 0.6pp)
North Hickory sat at the bull's-eye of the China boom: $6,030 of new imports per worker and a five-point collapse in factory employment. New York City, barely touched by Chinese manufacturing competition, lost essentially no factory share and kept adding high-paying service jobs. The same national trade policy produced opposite local destinies.
Furniture/Textiles hub
Finance, Media, Tech hub
What makes the China shock particularly cruel is its permanence. Autor and colleagues found no evidence of recovery in manufacturing employment or workers' lifetime earnings even a decade later.* Unlike the economic theory that promised new jobs would replace old ones, these communities experienced persistent unemployment, rising disability claims (Autor et al., 2014), and declining marriage rates (Autor et al., 2018).
The political consequences were profound: regions hit hardest by Chinese import competition shifted dramatically toward political extremes, expressing their economic despair through the ballot box (Feigenbaum & Hall, 2015; Autor et al., 2020). The bipartisan consensus on free trade, built over decades, shattered in these hollowed-out factory towns.
This wasn't creative destruction – it was just destruction. The China shock proves that when global capitalism moves too fast, it doesn't create opportunity; it creates wastelands.
*Note: A 2021 follow-up by Autor et al. found that while local GDP eventually rebounds through growth in health care, education, and retail sectors, manufacturing jobs and the lifetime earnings of displaced workers never recover.
These twelve charts tell a unified story: over the past 50 years, America has witnessed one of the largest transfers of wealth in human history – not between individuals, but between economic classes. The transfer from labor to capital, accelerated by automation and globalization.
Leading economists have reached a consensus: this wasn't accidental or inevitable. It was the result of deliberate policy choices, technological changes that favored capital, and the systematic dismantling of worker protections.
The question for America's future: Will we continue down this path, or will we build an economy that once again rewards work, not just wealth?
Current tax incentives systematically favor automation over employment
Feature | Description | Automation Impact |
---|---|---|
Bonus Depreciation (100%) | Firms can write off 100% of equipment/software investment in year one (phasing out by 2027 unless extended) | Encourages heavy upfront capex—robots, servers, automation infrastructure |
R&D Credits | Permanent tax credits for software, AI model development, robotics | Subsidizes capital-embodied innovation, not training or hiring |
No Payroll Tax on Machines | Labor comes with 15.3% FICA payroll tax; machines do not | Makes labor more expensive on a relative basis |
Stock-based pay deductibility | Firms deduct stock comp as an expense; helps subsidize lean, equity-heavy comp structures in tech | Incentivizes firms to grow value with fewer people, more IP and automation |
The new Build Back Better Act accelerates automation by dramatically shortening payback periods:
Provision | Pre-OBBBA | New rule | What it means for automation |
---|---|---|---|
Bonus depreciation | Phasing down (60% in 2024, 40% in 2025, zero by 2027) | 100% restored and made permanent for most 5- and 7-year equipment; separate 100% write-off for "qualified production property" through 2032 | Cuts after-tax cost of robots, servers, CNC machines by ~21% in the year of purchase. Speeds pay-back periods and raises IRR on cap-ex projects. |
Section 179 expensing | $1.22m cap, $3.05m phase-out (2024) | $2.5m cap, $4m phase-out | Small manufacturers can now write off an entire automated production line in year one. |
Structures | No bonus; 39-/27.5-year depreciation | Temporary 100% expensing for qualifying factories/warehouses begun 1/19/25-1/19/29 | Makes lights-out (fully automated) plants far cheaper to build relative to hiring labor in legacy space. |
R&D costs (§ 174) | Must be amortized 5 yrs U.S. / 15 yrs foreign (rule started 2022) | Immediate deduction for U.S. R&D; retro catch-up for 2022-24 | Lowers the cost of writing automation software, vision models, Gen-AI co-pilots; foreign R&D still amortized, nudging activity on-shore. |
Leading economists attribute labor's declining share to multiple reinforcing factors:
These estimates underscore that no single cause is responsible – it was a confluence of economic forces and deliberate policy choices that shifted rewards from labor to capital.
All data pulled from official FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) API:
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